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Abstract: Data is the new oil for the car industry. Cars generate data about how they are used and who’s behind the wheel
which gives rise to a novel way of profiling individuals. Several prior works have successfully demonstrated
the feasibility of driver re-identification using the in-vehicle network data captured on the vehicle’s CAN
(Controller Area Network) bus. However, all of them used signals (e.g., velocity, brake pedal or accelerator
position) that have already been extracted from the CAN log which is itself not a straightforward process.
Indeed, car manufacturers intentionally do not reveal the exact signal location within CAN logs. Nevertheless,
we show that signals can be efficiently extracted from CAN logs using machine learning techniques. We
exploit that signals have several distinguishing statistical features which can be learnt and effectively used
to identify them across different vehicles, that is, to quasi ”reverse-engineer” the CAN protocol. We also
demonstrate that the extracted signals can be successfully used to re-identify individuals in a dataset of 33
drivers. Therefore, not revealing signal locations in CAN logs per se does not prevent them to be regarded as
personal data of drivers.
1 INTRODUCTION
Our digital footprint is growing at an unprece-
dented scale. We use numerous devices and online
services creating massive amount of data 24/7. Some
of these data are personal, either concerning an iden-
tified or and identifiable natural person; thus, they
fall under the protection of the European General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) European Union
(2016b). In fact, to determine whether a natural per-
son is identifiable based on given data, one should
take account of all means reasonably likely to be used
(by the data controller or an adversary) to identify the
natural person. Such a technique is, e.g., singling out;
whether it is reasonably likely to be used depends on
the specific data and the scoio-technological context
it was collected in European Union (2016a).
One specific area where digitalization and data
generation are booming is automotive. From a set
of mechanical and electrical components, cars have
evolved into smart cyber-physical systems. Whereas
this evolution has enabled automakers to implement
advanced safety and entertainment functionalities, it
has also opened up novel attack surfaces for malicious
hackers and data collection opportunities for OEMs
and third parties. The backbone of a smart car is
the in-vehicle network which connects ECUs (Elec-
tronic Control Units); the most established vehicu-
lar network standard is called Control Area Network
(CAN) Voss (2008). CAN is already a critical tech-
nology worldwide making automotive data access a
commodity. One or more CAN buses carry all impor-
tant driving related information inside a car. OEMs
(Original Equipment Manufacturers, i.e., car makers)
collect and analyze CAN data for maintenance pur-
poses; however, CAN data might reveal other, more
personal traits, such as the driving behavior of natu-
ral persons. Such information could be invaluable to
third party service providers such as insurance com-
panies, fleet management services and other location-
based businesses (not to mention malicious entities),
hence there exist economic incentives for them to col-
lect or buy them.
It has been shown that automobile driver finger-
printing could be practical based on sensor signals
captured on the CAN bus in restricted environments
Enev et al. (2016). Using machine learning tech-
niques, authors re-identified drivers from a fixed set
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of experiment participants, thus implementing sin-
gling out, which makes this a privacy threat. There
is a caveat: the adversary has to know the higher
layer protocols of CAN in order to extract meaning-
ful sensor readings. Since such message and mes-
sage flow specifications (above the data link layer) are
usually proprietary and closely guarded industrial se-
crets, such adversarial background knowledge might
not be reasonable. In this case, the research question
changes: is it possible for an adversary to re-identify
drivers based on raw CAN data without the knowl-
edge of protocols above the data link layer?
Contributions. In this paper we investigate experi-
mentally the potential to identify and extract vehicle
sensor signals from raw CAN bus data for the sake of
inferring personal driving behavior and re-identifying
drivers. As signal positions, lengths and coding are
proprietary and vary among makes, models, model
years and even geographical area, first, we have to
interpret the messages. We emphasize that we do not
intend to perform (an even remotely) comprehensive
reverse engineering Sija et al. (2018); we focus solely
on a small number of sensor signals which are good
descriptors of natural driving behavior.
Our contributions are three-fold:
1. we devise a heuristic method for message decom-
position and log pre-processing;
2. we build, train and validate a machine learning
classifier that can efficiently match vehicle sensor
signals to a ground truth based on raw CAN data.
In particular, we train a classifier on the statistical
features of a signal in one car (e.g., Opel Astra),
then we use this trained classifier to localize the
same signal in a different car (e.g., Toyota). The
intuition is that the physical phenomenon repre-
sented by the signal has identical statistical fea-
tures across different cars, and hence can be used
to identify the same signal in all cars using the
same classifier;
3. we briefly demonstrate that re-identification of
drivers is possible using the extracted signals.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 2 presents related work. Section 3 gives a back-
ground on important characteristics of the Controller
Area Network. Section 4 describes our data collec-
tion process. Section 5 presents our efforts on mes-
sage decomposition and log pre-processing. Section
6 presents the design, evaluation and validation of
our random forest classifier for extracting sensor sig-
nals. Section 6.4.2 briefly demonstrates the success-
ful application of the extracted signals for driver re-
identification. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 RELATED WORK
Driver characterization based on CAN data has
gathered significant research interest from both the
automotive and the data privacy domain. The com-
mon trait in these works is the presumed familiarity
with the whole specific CAN protocol stack including
the presentation and application layers giving the re-
searchers access to sensor signals. This knowledge is
usually gained via access to the OEM’s documenta-
tions in the framework of some research cooperation.
As such, researchers do not normally disclose such
information to preserve secrecy.
Miyajima et al. has investigated Miyajima et al.
(2007) driver characteristics when following another
vehicle and pedal operation patterns were modeled
using speech recognition methods. Sensor signals
were collected in both a driving simulator and a real
vehicle. Using car-following patterns and spectral
features of pedal operation signals authors achieved
an identification rate of 89.6% for the simulator (12
drivers). For the field test, by only applying cep-
stral analysis on pedal signals the identification rate
was down to 76.8% (276 drivers). Fugiglando et
al. Fugiglando et al. (2018) developed a new method-
ology for near-real-time classification of driver be-
havior in uncontrolled environments, where 64 peo-
ple drove 10 cars for a total of over 2000 driving
trips without any type of predetermined driving in-
struction. Despite their advance use of unsupervised
machine learning techniques they conclude that clus-
tering drivers based on their behavior remains a chal-
lenging problem.
Hallac et al. Hallac et al. (2016) discovered
that driving maneuvers during turning exhibit per-
sonal traits that are promising regarding driver re-
identification. Using the same dataset from Audi
and its affiliates, Fugiglando et al. Fugiglando et al.
(2017), showed that four behavioral traits, namely
braking, turning, speeding and fuel efficiency could
characterize driver adequately well. They provided a
(mostly theoretical) methodology to reduce the vast
CAN dataset along these lines.
Enev et al. authored a seminal paper Enev et al.
(2016) which makes use of mostly statistical features
as an input for binary (one-vs-one) classification with
regard to driving behavior. Driving the same car in a
constrained parking lot setting and a longer but fixed
route, authors re-identified their 15 drivers with 100%
accuracy. Authors had access to all available sensor
signals and their scaling and offset parameters from
the manufacturer’s documentation.
In a paper targeted at anomaly detection in in-
vehicle networks Markovitz and Wool (2017), authors
developed a greedy algorithm to split the messages
into fields and to classify the fields into categories:
constant, multi-value and counter/sensor. Note that
the algorithm does not distinguish between counters
and sensor signals, and the semantics of the signals
are not interpreted. Thus, their results cannot be di-
rectly used for inferring driver behavior.
3 CAN: Controller Area Network
The Controller Area Network (CAN) is a bus sys-
tem providing in-vehicle communications for ECUs
and other devices. The first CAN bus protocol was
developed in 1986, and it was adopted as an interna-
tional standard in 1993 (ISO 11898). A recent car
can have anywhere from 5 up to 100 ECUs, which
are served by several CANs. Our point of focus is the
CAN serving the drive-train.
CAN is an overloaded term Szalay et al. (2015).
Originally, CAN refers to the ISO standard 11898-
1 specifying the physical and data link layers of the
CAN protocol stack. Second, another meaning is
connected to FMS-CAN (Fleet Management System
CAN), originally initiated by major truck manufactur-
ers, defined in the SAE standard family J1939; FMS-
CAN gives a full-stack specification including recom-
mendations on higher protocol layers. Third, CAN
refers to the multitude of proprietary CAN protocols
which are make and model specific. This results in
different message IDs, signal transformation parame-
ters and encoding. These protocols are usually based
on the standardized lower layers, but their higher lay-
ers are kept confidential by OEMs. The overwhelm-
ing majority of cars use one or more proprietary CAN
protocols. Generally, sensor signals in CAN variants
have a sampling frequency in the order of 10 ms.
On the other hand, using the standard on-board di-
agnostics (OBD, OBD-II) is a popular way of getting
data out of the car. Originally developed for mainte-
nance and technical inspection purposes and included
in every new car since 1996, OBD is also used for
telematics applications. Adding to the confusion re-
garding CAN, OBD has five minor variations includ-
ing one which is based on the CAN physical layer.
Sensor signals carried by OBD have a sampling fre-
quency in the order of 1 second. In certain vehicle
makes and models, one or more CANs are also con-
nected to the OBD2-II diagnostic port. In such cars,
also utilizing OBD over the CAN physical layer, it
is possible to extract fine-grained CAN data via an
OBD-II logger device.
Table 1 shows a simplified picture of a CAN mes-
sage with a 11-bit identifier, which is the usual format
for everyday cars; trucks and buses usually use the ex-
tended 29-bit version. This example shows an already
stripped message, i.e., we do not discuss end of frame
or check bits.
Components of a CAN bus message.
• Timestamp: Unix timestamp of the message
• CAN-ID: contains the message identifier - lower
values have higher priority (e.g. wheel angle,
speed, ...)
• Remote Transmission Request: allows ECUs to
request messages from other ECUs
• Length: length of the Data field in bytes (0 to 8
bytes)
• Data: contains the actual data values in hexadeci-
mal format. The Data field needs to be broken to
sensor signals, transformed and/or converted to a
human-readable format in order to enable further
analysis.
Throughout this paper, we focus on the three prac-
tically relevant fields: CAN-ID, Length and Data.
4 DATA COLLECTION
As CAN data logs are not widely available, we
conducted a measurement campaign. For data collec-
tion in particular we connected a logging device to the
OBD-II port and logged all observed messages from
various ECUs. Such a device acts as a node on the
CAN bus and is able to read and store all broadcasted
messages. Our team developed both the logging de-
vice (based on a Raspberry PI 3) and the logging soft-
ware (in C). Note that it is common that the OBD2
connector is found under the steering wheel. Also
note that not all car makes and models connect the
CAN serving the drive-train ECUs (or any CAN) to
the OBD-II port (e.g., Volkswagen, BMW, etc.); in
this case we could not log any meaningful data.
We have gathered meaningful data from 8 differ-
ent cars and a total number of 33 drivers. We did not
put any restriction on the demographics of the dif-
ferent drivers or the route taken. In each case we
asked the driver to drive for a period of 30-60 min-
utes, while our device logged data from every route
the drivers took. Drivers were free to choose their
way, but still conforming to three practical require-
ments: (1) record at least 2 hours of driving in total,
(2) do not record data when driving up and down on
hills or mountains, (3) do not record data in extremely
heavy traffic (short runs and idling). Free driving was
recorded for all 33 drivers with an Opel Astra 2018:
13 people were between the age of 20-30, 12 between
Table 1: Example of CAN messages
Timestamp CAN-ID Request Length Data
1481492683.285052 0x0208 000 0x8 0x00 0x00 0x32 0x00 0x0e 0x32 0xfe 0x3c
1497323915.123844 0x018e 000 0x8 0x03 0x03 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x07 0x3f
1497323915.112910 0x00f1 000 0x6 0x28 0x00 0x00 0x40 0x00 0x00
30-40, and 8 above 40; there were 5 women and 28
men; 11 with less experience (less than 7000 km per
year on average or novice driver), 9 with average ex-
perience (8-14000 km per year), and 13 with above
average experience (more than 14000 km per year).
We gathered data from the following cars: Citroen
C4 2005 (22 message IDs), Toyota Corolla 2008 (36
IDs), Toyota Aygo 2014 (48 IDs), Renault Megane
2007 (20 IDs), Opel Astra 2018 (72 IDs), Opel As-
tra 2006 (18 IDs), Nissan X-trail 2008 (automatic, 34
IDs) and Nissan Qashqai 2015 (60 IDs). We would
like to emphasize that the two Opel Astras use com-
pletely different prorpietary CAN versions (even the
only 2 common IDs correspond to completely dif-
ferent Data). We also recorded the GPS coordinates
via an Android smartphone during at least one logged
drive per car. Most routes were driven inside or close
to Budapest; approximately 15-20% was recorded on
a motorway.
5 CAN DATA ANALYSIS
All recorded messages contained 4 to 8 bytes of
data; this made it likely that multiple (potentially un-
related) pieces of information can be sent under the
same ID. We first assumed that signals are positioned
over whole bytes; this turned out to be wrong. Our in-
vestigation revealed that besides signal values a mes-
sage can also contain constants, multi-value fields and
counters. Some values appear only on-demand, such
as windscreen or window signals. All data apart from
sensor signals are considered noise and, therefore,
need to be removed.
Meaningful CAN IDs vary significantly across ve-
hicle makes and models, therefore we expected that
the only signals found in all cars with high probability
are the basic ones: such as velocity, brake, clutch and
accelerator pedal positions, RPM (round per minute)
and steering wheel angle. Next, we devise a method
that yields a deeper understanding of the Data field
in CAN messages and a possibility for sensor signal
extraction. Note that from this point we will use the
term ID as a reference to both a given type of message
and its data stream (time series).
5.1 Bit decomposition heuristics
Extracting the signals from a CAN message is not a
trivial challenge. While monitoring the data stream
while driving and finding the exact bits that change in
reaction to one’s actions is possible, it is highly time
consuming, does not scale with hundreds of different
existing CAN protocol versions and bound to miss
out on potential sensor signals. (We only took this
approach with a single car model to generate train-
ing data and a validation framework for our machine
learning solution.) Our objective here is to present our
observations on message types and distributions that
leads to a smarter message decomposition method.
First, we examined the message streams literally
bit-by-bit. We presumed that inside a given ID with
potentially multiple sensor readings there was a dif-
ference in their bit value distribution, hence they
could be systematically located and partitioned ac-
cording to some rule. E.g., let us assume that there
are two signals sent next to each other under the same
ID (i.e., there are no zero bits or other separators be-
tween the two. Given that signals are encoded in a
big endian (little endian) format, both of their MSBs
(LSBs) are rarely 1s. Therefore, there should be a
drop in bit probability (i.e., the probability for a given
bit to be 1) between the last bit of the first signal and
the first bit of the second signal. In order to visualize
these drops we represent IDs by their bit distribution:
we sum the number of messages for each ID and how
many times a given bit was one and divide these two
measures:
vi =
∑|v|j=11{v j=1}
|v|
where v denotes the binary vector of a given ID,
that is the representation of a CAN message’s payload
in binary format, and where vi denotes the probability
of a bit being 1 at the ith position.
When we examined the distribution of the bits in
an ID we found that that in some cases it is straight-
forward to extract a signal: between two signal candi-
dates there were separator bits with vi = 0 or vi = 1.
Other cases were more complex: given Figure 1(a)
it is hard to determine signal borders. However,
combined with the bit distribution from the same ID
and car model but another drive, the signals became
clearly distinguishable.
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Figure 1: Bit distribution of the same ID from different
drivers
5.2 Pre-processing
After examining bit distributions we realized that ≈
90% of candidate signal blocks are placed on one or
two bytes. In other cases signal borders were not un-
ambiguous, see Figure 2. Our first heuristic suggests
a start of a new signal because of the drop at the 23rd
and the 24th bits, although it is clearly a counter or
a constant on 3 bits, but we can not determine where
exactly a new signal starts (is it the 28th bit or the
32nd?). Moreover, the 41th bit is constant 1 bit which
might signify some kind of a separator, yet we cannot
be certain. After a long evaluation we decided to di-
vide the data part of the messages to bytes and pairs
of bytes; as a result for one ID we could define 4 to 8
sensor candidates.
Filtering. Examining the byte time series resulting
from the above approach, we spotted that many se-
ries were constant, had very few values, were cyclic
(counters) or changed very rarely. As we intended
to use machine learning to find the exact signals, not
0 8 16 24 32 40 48 56
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Figure 2: Consecutive blocks in a CAN message that cannot
be unambiguously divided
filtering these samples could have caused significant
performance loss and a bloated and skewed training
dataset with a lot of similar negative samples resulting
in a decreased variability of training data potentially
to a degree of corrupting the model. Therefore, we
evaluated the variation for each sample and excluded
those that had a very low variation (”low variation”
was also a free variable optimized during evaluation).
Normalization. We scaled all candidate time series
to the interval of [0,1]: we extracted the maximum
value for the whole candidate series, then we divided
all values by the maximum. Scaling the data solves
the problem of transformed (shifted) values, i.e., the
same signal can take different values during drives,
that can be a result of some transformation on the
data in one vehicle or simply the fact that one car was
driven in a lower range of velocity in contrast to the
other (i.e., one log comes from a drive that did not ex-
ceed 50 km/h while the other rarely drove slower than
100 km/h).
Sliding windows. We divided logs into overlap-
ping sliding windows from which we extracted our
features for machine learning. The sliding window
length (elapsed time) and percentage of overlap with
previous and successive windows were free variables
which we set to default values and subsequently opti-
mized during run time.
6 Classification
We use machine learning for two purposes; first,
to extract signals from CAN messages, and second,
to perform driver re-identification using the extracted
signals. Therefore, we build two different types of
classifiers. In order to extract signals, we train a clas-
sifier per signal on the statistical features of the signal
in a base car (e.g., Opel Astra 2018) where we ex-
actly know where the signal resides, that is, the mes-
sage ID and byte number of the CAN message which
contains the signal. Then, we use the trained models
to identify the same signals in another car (e.g., Toy-
ota) where the locations of the signals (i.e., message
ID and byte number) are unknown. The intuition is
that the physical phenomenon that a signal represents
has identical statistical features irrespective of the car,
and hence can be used to identify the same signal in
all cars using the same classifier.
For driver re-identification, similarly to previ-
ous works (Fugiglando et al., 2018; Miyajima et al.,
2007), we use a separate classifier that is trained on
the already extracted signals of the car. This classifier
learns the distinguishing features of different drivers
(and not that of signals like the first classifier) using
the signals produced during their drives.
For both signal extraction and driver re-
identification, the features computed from each
sliding window constitute a single training sample
(i.e., a sample vector) used as the input of our
machine learning classifiers. Below we describe
the classifiers, the division of training and test-
ing samples, and the method used for multi-class
classification.
6.1 Multi-class Classification
We implemented multiclass classification using bi-
nary classification in a one-vs-rest way (aka, one-vs-
all (OvA), one-against-all (OAA)). The strategy in-
volves training a single classifier per class, with the
samples of that class as positive samples and all other
samples as negatives. For signal extraction, a class
represents a pair of message ID and byte number,
whereas for driver re-identification, it represents a
driver’s identity. A random forest model was trained
per class with balanced training data (i.e., containing
the same number of positive and negative samples),
and its output was binary indicating whether the input
sample belongs to the class or not. For signal extrac-
tion, as each training/testing sample is a small portion
of the time-series (i.e., window) representing a signal,
we apply the trained model on all portions of a signal
and obtain multiple decisions per signal. Then, the
”votes” are aggregated and the candidate signal with
the most number of ”votes” is selected.
We would like to stress that random forests are in-
deed capable of general multiclass classification with-
out its transformation to binary. We have also tried
this general multiclassification approach, however, its
results were inferior to the OvA’s results. Moreover
successful driver re-identification can already be car-
Table 2: Average feature importances
Feature Importance
count below mean 0.2113
count above mean 0.1482
cid ce 0.1290
mean abs change 0.1048
maximum 0.0716
longest strike below mean 0.0708
ried out using a single or only a few signals Enev et al.
(2016). In this paper, we use the velocity, the brake
pedal, the accelerator pedal, the clutch pedal and the
RPM signals to extract for driver re-identification.
6.2 Feature extraction
Our classifiers use statistical features of the samples;
for each sliding window we extracted 20 different
statistics that are widely considered as most descrip-
tive regarding time series characteristics (see the best
features in Table 2. We finally used 15 features based
on their importances calculated from our random for-
est models. These features are the following:
1. count above mean(x): Returns the number of val-
ues in x that are higher than the mean of x.
2. count below mean(x): Returns the number of
values in x that are lower than the mean of x.
3. longest strike above mean(x): Returns the
length of the longest consecutive subsequence in
x that is bigger than the mean of x.
4. longest strike below mean(x): Returns the
length of the longest consecutive subsequence in
x that is smaller than the mean of x.
5. binned entropy(x,max bins): First bins the val-
ues of x into max bins equidistant bins. The
max bin parameter was generally set to 10. Then
calculates the value of:
−∑min(max bins,len(x))k=0 pk · log(pk) ·1{pk>0}
where pk is the percentage of samples in bin k.
6. mean abs change(x): Returns the mean over the
absolute differences between subsequent time se-
ries values which is:
1
n ∑i=1,...,n−1 |xi+1− xi|
7. mean change(x): Returns the mean over the dif-
ferences between subsequent time series values
which is:
1
n ∑i=1,...,n−1(xi+1− xi)
8. OTHER: minimum, maximum, mean, median,
standard variation, variance, kurtosis, skewness
This way we created an input vector of features for
each sample (one sample corresponds to one win-
dow). No smoothing, outlier elimination or function
approximation are performed on the samples before
feature extraction. For calculating the above statis-
tics, we used the ts f resh python package1 .
6.3 Training and model optimization
For training our classifier we need to have a ground
truth of sensor signals from a single car. These cer-
tified signals then can be compared to the candidate
signals from other cars to find the best match. We
chose the Opel Astra 2018 as our reference, as we
had the most drives logged from this car.
Velocity versus GPS. We recorded GPS coordinates
for all drives with the Opel Astra 2018. Setting the
Android GPS Logger app to the highest accuracy
(complemented by cell tower information achieving
an accuracy of 3 meters) and saving the coordinates
every second, we ended up with a time series of lo-
cations. Using the timestamps, GPS time series also
determines the mean velocity between neighboring
locations, producing a velocity time series. Intu-
itively, the GPS based velocity is very close to the one
recorded from the CAN bus.
In order to test this hypothesis we applied the
Dynamic Time Warp algorithm (DTW) Salvador and
Chan (2007). The DTW algorithm is part of time
series classification algorithms Bagnall et al. (2016),
their important characteristic being that there may be
discriminatory features dependent on the ordering of
the time series values Geurts (2001). A distance mea-
surement between time series is needed to determine
similarity between time series and for classification.
Euclidean distance is an efficient distance measure-
ment that can be used. The Euclidean distance be-
tween two time series is simply the sum of the squared
distances from each nth point in one time series to the
nth point in the other. The main disadvantage of us-
ing Euclidean distance for time series data is that its
results are very un-intuitive. If two time series are
identical, but one is shifted slightly along the time
axis, then Euclidean distance may consider them to
be very different from each other. DTW was intro-
duced to overcome this limitation and give intuitive
distance measurements between time series by ignor-
ing both global and local shifts in the time dimension.
DTW finds the optimal alignment between two time
series if one time series may be warped non-linearly
by stretching or shrinking it along its time axis.
Before running DTW we excluded the outliers
from the GPS-based velocity series. These points are
1https://tsfresh.readthedocs.io/en/latest/
Table 3: DTW velocity search top results
CAN ID Byte Distance
0410 1-2 7499
0410 2-3 15972
0295 1-2 20609
0510 2 20981
0510 3 21585
the result of GPS measurement error and materialize
in extreme differences between two neighboring ve-
locity values (we used 30 km/h as a limit). We then
ran DTW with the GPS-based velocity values against
all other sensor candidates of the CAN log. As the re-
sult of the DTW algorithm is a distance between two
series, the smallest distance yields the best match: in
every case it was indeed the same ID by a wide mar-
gin (see Table 3). We used manual physical tryouts to
corroborate that this ID indeed corresponds to veloc-
ity.
Brake vs. accelerator: pedal position. Extract-
ing the brake and the accelerator pedal positions re-
quired a different approach. In a normal vehicle the
accelerator and the brake pedal are not pressed at the
same time because it contradicts a driver’s normal be-
haviour (excluding race car drivers). Consequently,
to extract the accelerator and the brake pedal posi-
tions one only have to search for a pair of signals that
are almost exclusive to each other. For this end, we
compared all pairs of ID byte subseries from multiple
drives and listed the candidates that fit the descrip-
tion. Figure 3(a) shows the correct result and Figure
3(b) shows false candidate. False results were easy to
exclude because of their characteristics; in this exam-
ple it is trivial that a piece-wise constant signal can-
not possibly signify a pedal position. Finally, we used
manual physical tryouts to corroborate that these IDs
indeed correspond to the brake and accelerator pedal
positions, respectively. Note that older vehicles can
have a binary brake (and clutch) signal, as there is no
corresponding sensor signal in them.
Clutch vs. RPM vs. velocity. The clutch pedal po-
sition also has very typical characteristics especially
when compared with the velocity and RPM values.
Once we start to accelerate from 0km/h usually we
change the gears quickly, thus the changes in the rpm
and clutch pedal position are easy to detect. Upon
gear change the RPM drops, then rises as we accel-
erate, then drops and rises again until we reach the
desired gear and velocity. During the same time we
push the clutch pedal every time just before the gear
is changed. Moreover, we tend to use the clutch pedal
in a very typical way, when the driver releases the
clutch there is a slight slip around the middle posi-
tion of the pedal indicating that the shafts start to con-
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(a) Brake pedal (black) vs. accelerator pedal (red) position
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(b) A false match
Figure 3: Searching for the brake and accelerator pedal position signals
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Figure 4: The clutch pedal position (black) vs. RPM (blue) vs. velocity (red) of one of our test vehicles.
nect. (Note that the length of this slip is characteristic
for car models, condition (e.g., bad clutch) and driver
experience.) Applying this common knowledge we
searched for a pair of signals with one of them hav-
ing a sharp spike (RPM) and the other a small plat-
form (slipping clutch) around the same time. We nar-
rowed our search to cases when the vehicle acceler-
ated from zero to at most 50 km/h. In Figure 4 we
can see these signal characteristics compared to each
other. We managed to find the clutch pedal position
and RPM signals based on the above. As before, we
validated our findings with manual physical tryouts.
Optimization. After extracting the ground truth sig-
nals, we calculated the feature vectors and trained a
random forest classifier for each extracted signal: ve-
locity, brake pedal position, accelerator pedal posi-
tion, clutch pedal position and engine RPM. For pa-
rameter optimization and testing we tested our model
on logs from the same car, but driven by another
driver on another route.
6.4 Results
Next we describe the performance of our classifiers
used to extract signals from CAN logs (in Section
6.4.1) and to re-identify drivers using the extracted
signals (in Section 6.4.2).
6.4.1 Signal extraction
Our random forest classifiers used for signal extrac-
tion are trained on the CAN logs of a base car (here
it is an Opel Astra’18) where the locations of a target
signal is known. The classifiers take statistical data
vectors as inputs with the 15 statistical features (see in
Section 6.2) extracted from each sample (window). In
particular, we train a random forest classifier to distin-
guish a target signal from all other signals, where the
positive training samples are composed of the win-
dows of the time series corresponding to the target
signal, whereas negative samples are taken from other
signals’ time series. Hence, we obtain a classifier per
target signal. Recall that signal locations are com-
puted using the techniques described in Section 6.3.
We apply each trained classifier on all the samples
(windows) of all time series in another (target) car
where we want to locate the corresponding target sig-
nals. For every classifier, we obtain a classification
for each window of each time series in the target car.
The time series which receives the largest number of
votes (i.e., has the most windows classified as posi-
tive) will be the matched signal, i.e. the signal which
is the most similar to the target signal.
Best results were obtained using the following pa-
rameter settings: the length of windows is set to 2.5
seconds, which is sufficiently large to capture differ-
ent driver reactions (one can accelerate from 0 to even
30 km/h or can hit the brakes and stop the vehicle).
The sampled logs are at least 30 minutes long, the
overlap parameter is set to 25%. The pruning param-
eter is set to 7, i.e. a sample was excluded when its
variation is less than 7.
Each trained random forest classifier is tested
against samples from logs of all other cars except the
base car, and the logs were pre-processed as described
in Section 5.2. The matching performed by a clas-
sifier is validated by manually extracting the ground
truth sensor signal from the target car as described in
Section 6.3. In order to measure the accuracy of our
classifier, we report the rank of the true signal; each
candidate signal is ranked according to the number of
votes (i.e., positive classifications) they receive, i.e.
the signal having the highest vote ranked first.
Table 4 shows the results of signal extraction us-
ing only 30 minutes of data for training and also 30
minutes for matching (testing), where training was
performed on CAN logs obtained from our base car
(i.e., Opel Astra’18). Three signals (RPM, velocity
and accelerator pedal position) are all ranked in the
first place (i.e. received the highest number of votes in
the classifier),that is, our approach successfully iden-
tified all three signals in all the target cars. Note that
we did not exract the clutch and the brake pedal posi-
tion signals as during the validation we realized that
these signals do not even exist in most of our cars in
the database.
We also report the precision (TP/TP+FP) and re-
call (TP/TP+FN) of the classifier (where TP=true pos-
itive, FP=false positive and FN=false negative) which
represent how many positive classifications are cor-
rect over all samples of all time-series in the CAN log
(precision), and how many samples of the true match-
ing signal are correctly recognized by the classifier
(recall). We also compute and report the gap which is
the difference between the number of votes (i.e., pos-
itive classifications) of the highest ranked true signal
Table 4: Top results against RPM, velocity and acceleration
Sensor Rank Precision Recall Gap
Citroen rpm 1 0.353 0.952 0.180
Citroen velo 1 0.874 0.792 0.094
Citroen acc 1 0.740 0.444 0.431
Opel A06 rpm 1 0.155 0.604 0.035
Opel A06 velo 1 0.158 0.969 0.024
Opel A06 acc 1 0.207 0.934 0.026
Toyota A rpm 1 0.229 0.717 0.238
Toyota A velo 1 0.230 0.214 0.337
Toyota A acc 1 0.394 0.566 0.296
Toyota C rpm 1 0.224 0.399 0.049
Toyota C velo 1 0.676 0.139 0.029
Toyota C acc 1 0.602 0.522 0.134
Renault rpm 1 0.439 0.991 0.148
Renault velo 1 0.890 0.522 0.465
Renault acc 1 0.491 0.702 0.210
Nissan X rpm 1 0.248 0.805 0.140
Nissan X velo 1 0.970 0.870 0.466
Nissan X acc 1 0.484 0.728 0.527
Nissan Q rpm 1 0.211 0.680 0.034
Nissan Q velo 1 0.462 0.522 0.110
Nissan Q acc 1 0.512 0.774 0.044
and that of the highest ranked false signal divided by
the total number of votes. For example if the high-
est ranked true signal received 50% of the votes and
the highest ranked false signal received 20%, then the
gap equals 0.30. Note that in most cars most sensors
appear under several IDs in the log, this causes that
more than one candidate with very high votes are all
true positives, thus the top high ranks can all be true
positives and the highest ranked false signal drops to
the fourth, fifth or even lower places.
6.4.2 Driver re-identification
Next we use the extracted signals in a driver re-
identification scenario. We use the same preprocess-
ing as in Section 5.2 and the same parameter settings
as in Section 6.3, except that we do not use all 15
features, only 11 of them are chosen based on their
importances: count above mean, count below mean,
longest strike above mean, longest strike below mean,
maximum, mean, mean abs change, median, mini-
mum, standard deviation, variance. We used four ex-
tracted signals: accelerator and brake pedal positions,
velocity and RPM. The feature vector of a driver con-
sists of 44 features altogether. All drivers used the
same car, which was Opel Astra’18, to produce CAN
logs. The samples were divided into a training and
testing set, where the training and testing data made
90% and 10% of all samples, respectively. We used
10-fold cross-validation to evaluate our approach. We
selected 5 drivers uniformly at random, and built a bi-
nary classifier for each pair of drivers. Our classifier
achieved 77% precision on average (each model was
evaluated 10 times). The worst result was just under
70% and the best result was 87%.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We described a technique to extract signals from
vehicles’ CAN logs. Our approach relies on using
unique statistical features of signals which remain
mostly unchanged even between different types of
cars, and hence can be used to locate the signals in
the CAN log. We demonstrated that the extracted sig-
nals can be used to effectively identify drivers in a
dataset of 33 drivers. Although our results need to
be evaluated on a larger and more diverse dataset, our
findings show that driver re-identification can be per-
formed without the nuisance of signal extraction or
agreements with a manufacturer. This means that not
revealing the exact signal location in CAN logs is not
sufficient to provide any privacy guarantee in prac-
tice. Car companies should devise more principled
(perhaps cryptographic) approaches to hide signals,
and/or to anonymize their CAN logs so that drivers
cannot be re-identified.
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